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 Paul Russell argues that the interpretation of Hume as a classical compatibilist is misguided. 
Russell defends a naturalistic reading of Humean freedom and moral responsibility. On this account, 
Hume holds two theses: that moral responsibility is a product of our moral sentiments, and that our 
concept of moral freedom is derived from our considerations of moral responsibility. Russell claims 
that Hume’s theory of the passions is non-cognitivist, and thus that his account of moral judgment 
fails to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions or qualities of mind. He concludes that 
Hume’s account of moral responsibility is inadequate. I argue that Hume has a cognitivist account of 
the passions. For Hume, our character is judged to be a proper object of praise or censure on 
account of our ability to partake in a moral community with our fellows. I conclude that Hume does 
not naturalize freedom and moral responsibility, but socializes it.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 The subject of this paper is David Hume’s account of moral freedom.1 Hume is traditionally 
considered, alongside Thomas Hobbes, to be a classical compatibilist. In, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: 
Hume’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility, Paul Russell argues that the classical compatibilist 
interpretation of Hume is misguided. In its place, Russell defends a naturalistic reading of Hume’s 
account of freedom and moral responsibility. Two claims are central to Russell’s naturalist 
interpretation: first, Hume regards moral responsibility as product of the moral sentiments, not 
reason; and second, Hume’s account of moral freedom, the liberty of spontaneity, is derived from 
his concept of moral responsibility, and not the other way around (as the classical compatibilist 
interpretation suggests). Russell gives the label “feeling naturalism” to the first claim, and “scientific 
naturalism” to the second one. On both of these points, Russell finds parallels between Hume and 
P.F. Strawson.2  
 With his naturalistic interpretation, Russell claims that he can breathe new life into Hume’s 
philosophy and bolster the larger naturalist research project in contemporary philosophy. 
Nevertheless, Russell argues that Hume’s account of freedom and moral responsibility is flawed. 
Insofar as Hume claims that moral responsibility is a product of the moral sentiments, Russell argues 
that he must allow for cognitive-evaluative content in his account of passions. Otherwise, 
attributions of responsibility could be the result of mere prejudice. Russell also argues that because, 
                                                          
1 I use the terms “free will,” “freedom,” and “moral freedom” interchangeably. For my purposes, it is 
important to distinguish these three terms only from “political freedom,” which I do not consider in this 
paper.  
2 In his essay “Freedom and Resentment,” Strawson famously argued that our concept of moral 
responsibility is composed of our reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, etc.). See P.F. 
Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (New York: Routledge 
Press, 2008). Because Russell spends a great deal of time considering the similarities between Strawson and 
Hume in his book—and with good reason—I do so as well throughout this paper.  
 2 
for Hume, moral judgments are made about character traits, these judgments fail to track the crucial 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions or qualities of mind.  
 While Russell’s concerns are reasonable, the force of his criticisms derives from three 
matters of questionable interpretation. First, Russell construes Humean necessity as a regularity 
theory, and argues that it commits him to the “dual ontology of existence” thesis, or a dualistic 
metaphysics. Second, Russell takes Hume’s account of the passions to be purely descriptive and 
mechanistic. Third, Russell’s claims that, for Hume, attributions of moral responsibility function 
independently from considerations of moral freedom.  
 I argue that Hume can provide adequate responses to Russell. Following Annette Baier, I 
propose that Hume’s concept of causal necessity is normative, being based on the correct functioning 
of our rational capacities.3 This normative construal of causal necessity allows for a tight connection 
between reason and the sentiments; which, combined with the insight that the sentiments are already 
socially reflexive, yields an account of the passions that is both social and infused with reason. From this, 
we learn that our character is judged to be a proper object of social praise and censure on account of 
our moral competency, or our ability to partake in a moral community with our fellows.  
 On account of the latter insights, I argue that Hume does not naturalize freedom and moral 
responsibility, but socializes it. My interpretation is not a radical departure from Russell’s naturalistic 
reading, but a furthering of his project. Russell recognized that Hume’s account of moral 
responsibility was both social and sentimental, but he failed to reevaluate Hume’s theory of moral 
freedom in light of this fact. My object in this paper is to pick up where Russell left off; modifying 
his view where it is necessary to do so. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Annette C. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise (Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1991). 
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2. THE FREE WILL PROBLEM 
 
 
2.1 The Bramhall and Hobbes Debate 
 
 In 1645, amidst the calamity of the English Civil War, two prominent intellectuals exiled 
from their native soil convened in Paris to discuss the highest of metaphysical matters: the freedom 
of the will. The first, Bishop John Bramhall, was a theologian equally well-known for his apologetics 
and his unwavering support of the English monarchy. The second, Thomas Hobbes, was a scientist 
and philosopher, whose recently published political treatise, De Cive, had greatly stirred the 
European Respublica literaria.  
 Hobbes held a mechanistic world-view, influenced equally by Galileo and Vesalius, which 
stated that both nature and human action are governed solely by the laws of motion.4 As he notes in 
the Leviathan, “life is but a motion of the limbs, the beginning whereof is some principle within.”5 
The principle that Hobbes is alluding to is appetite and fear; for it is our appetites (desires, pleasures, 
etc.) and fears (aversion, pains, etc.) that serve as the springs of all human action.6 In addition, 
Hobbes was a necessitarian, as he judged that all events (natural and human) arose necessarily out of 
their preceding conditions: “the sum of all those things which, being now existent, conduce and 
concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the 
effect could not be produced. This concourse of causes, whereof everyone is determined to be such 
                                                          
4 Galileo Galilei (1564-1642): Italian physicist, astronomer, mathematician, philosopher, and author of 
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564): Dutch physician, anatomist, and 
author of On the Fabric of the Human Body. Galileo and Vesalius are, in many ways, the fathers of the mechanist 
philosophy.  
5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (New York: Penguin Classics, 1968), 81. 
6 “The motion, in which consisteth pleasure or pain, is also a solicitation or provocation either to draw near 
to the thing that pleaseth, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth; and this solicitation is the endeavour or 
internal beginning of animal motion, which when the object delighteth, is called appetite; when it displeaserth, 
it is called aversion.” Thomas Hobbes, “Human Nature,” in British Moralists 1650-1800, vol. 1, ed. D.D. 
Raphael (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 4. 
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as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called…the decree of God.”7 The 
concurrence of appetites felt by the human being is sufficient for all subsequent behavior; nothing 
else is requited, as behavior flows mechanistically from the experience of desire or aversion.  
 Bramhall rejected Hobbes’ mechanism and necessitarianism. As a staunch libertarian, 
Bramhall denied Hobbes’ conjecture that human action is governed solely by mechanistic laws. 
Instead, human action is exercised through “the will,” the rational faculty of the mind that gives an 
agent the “power of election” when she is confronted with potential courses of action.8 When God 
offered to grant to King Solomon wisdom in exchange for the possibility of immeasurable riches, 
Bramhall notes that “it was in his [King Solomon] own power to give it, and it was in his own power 
to retain it. Yet if he did give it, he could not retain it and if he did retain it, he could not give it. 
Therefore we may do what we do not, and we do not what we might do. That is, we have true 
liberty from necessity.”9 Bramhall argues that the reality of human choice secures our liberty from the 
threat of Hobbes’ mechanistic philosophy.  
 The disagreement between Hobbes and Bramhall centers on the controversy regarding the 
relation between liberty and necessity. Bramhall deems the task of reconciling liberty with necessity to 
be to be woefully misguided because “necessity consists in an antecedent determination to 
one…true liberty consists in the elective power of the rational will.”10 He reasons that “that which is 
necessitated may agree well enough with my fancy or desires, and obtain my subsequent consent; but 
that which is determined without my concurrence or consent cannot be the object of my election.”11 
Bramhall argues that genuine liberty involves the ability to “elect” actions under conditions where 
the agent has alternative possibilities, making liberty and necessity logically incompatible concepts. This 
                                                          
7 Vere Chappell, ed., Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 20. 
8 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 1 
9 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 2 
10
 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 43 
11 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 43 
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seems like an intuitive position. If I could not—under the compulsion of the laws of nature—do 
other than throw a rock through my neighbor’s window, it would surely be absurd to say that I was 
free to throw the rock through her window. As Bramhall points out, “if the supposition be not in the 
agent’s power, nor depend on anything in his power; if there be an exterior antecedent cause which 
does necessitate the effect, to call this free is to be mad with reason.”12  
 Hobbes denies the antagonism between liberty and necessity. He argues that the concepts of 
liberty and necessity, properly construed, are compatible with one another because all actions 
(voluntary or otherwise) are the product of necessary causes: “whatsoever is produced is produced 
necessarily, for whatsoever is produced has a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it has not been; 
and therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated.”13 Hobbes’ account of liberty, being thus 
annexed to necessity, concerns the ability of an agent to do as she chooses to do, and not on her ability 
to do otherwise. As he points out, “liberty is [simply] the absence of all the impediments to action that 
are not contained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent.”14 An agent is at liberty to learn 
how to play the violin if she both has the desire to learn how to play the violin, and the ability to do 
so. Notice that this does not require that the agent elected the violin playing, for her desire to play 
the violin may be determined. Nevertheless, on Hobbes’ view, we could rightfully say that her 
learning to the play the violin was voluntary.  
 Bramhall defines the will as the legislative faculty of the human mind. It serves two 
functions: imperatus (execution of action) and actus elicitus (election of action).15 In the first case, the 
will dictates commands to the body. Bramhall gives the example of opening and closing one’s 
eyelids. The will compels the body to open or shut the eyelids, causing direct movement in the 
                                                          
12 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 9  
13 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 38 
14 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 38 
15 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 9 
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muscle, which then opens or closes the eyelids.16 The second function of the will is to elect possible 
courses of action. Once an action is selected by the will, the relevant lower faculties are determined 
to comply. Compulsion derives from the will, but the will itself is not compelled; it is the causa sui of 
all voluntary human action.17 This notion of the will “electing different courses of action” entails 
that there truly are different courses of action available to him. Take the example of a heroin addict 
named Bob, whose addiction drives him to take drastic actions to secure the drug. Because of his 
addiction, Bob has the desire to rob a bank, and succeeds in doing so. Bob’s end state—acquiring 
the funds for heroin—was realized as a result of his desire to rob the bank, which resulted from his 
original desire to inject heroin. For Hobbes, Bob is spontaneously free to both shoot the heroin and 
rob the bank since in both cases he has “done what he chose to do.” Bramhall would find the 
conclusion that Bob freely chose to shoot the heroin to be dubious because his original desire to 
inject the heroin was necessitated by his addiction to it. Because Bob did not elect for his desire to 
shoot the heroin, it would be incorrect to hold him responsible for any action that necessarily 
followed from the desire.18 For Bob to be genuinely free, he needs to enjoy a liberty of indifference, so 
that his will may be undetermined in its choices.19  
 Hobbes agrees with Bramhall that the will is the cause of all voluntary human action. 
However, because all actions are caused by the appetites for Hobbes, the will cannot be anything but 
a type of appetite—in particular, an appetite that compels the agent to act. Hobbes gives a five-step 
                                                          
16 This, as Bramhall notes, is “in truth the act of some inferior faculty subject to the command of the will.” 
He also refers to this act of the will as more “remote.” Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 9. 
17 Bramhall notes that “This [an actus elicitus] may be stopped or hindered by the intervening impediment of 
the understanding, as a stone lying on a table is kept from its natural motion; otherwise the will should have 
some kind of omnipotence. But the will cannot be compelled to act repugnant to its inclination, as when a 
stone is thrown upwards into the air; that is both to incline and not to incline to the same object at the same 
time, which implies a contradiction.” Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 9. 
18 Bramhall notes that, in this case “I do it [the action] not out of any voluntary election, but out of an 
inevitable necessity,” Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 1 
19 The “liberty of indifference” is a scholastic term used to describe a form of liberty that was absent all causal 
necessitation. It is commonly contrasted with the “liberty of spontaneity,” which refers to a notion of liberty 
that is consistent with causal necessitation, and holds that all actions are free insofar as they are uncompelled.  
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mechanistic account of how this works. First, we encounter an external object. Second, we 
experience a mix of aversion and appetite towards the object. Third, this creates the impetus for 
deliberation, which takes places in an agent through an “alternate succession of appetite and fear.”20 
Fourth, this deliberation eventually ceases due to the potency of a certain desire. Finally, this desire 
results in a course of action. Controversially, Hobbes takes this last link in this chain of deliberation 
simply to be the will: the passions…proceed not from, but are the will.”21 It doesn’t make sense on 
Hobbes’ account to say that a willed action is not free. All actions that derive from internal desires 
are free by definition. Hobbes’ only criterion for a free action is that it has “its beginning in the will.”22 
An agent fails to be free only when she is subject to external constraints on her actions. Bramhall 
ridicules this “madness of reason”; but for Hobbes, freedom of spontaneity is the only freedom that 
we could have.  
 The debate between Thomas Hobbes and Bishop John Bramhall represents what is at stake 
in the controversy of the freedom of the will. Hobbes’ mechanism allows him to evade questions 
about the metaphysical nature of the will.23 As a result, his account of the “freedom of spontaneity” is 
reasonably straightforward. Nonetheless, many of Bramhall’s criticisms of Hobbes are convincing. 
Hobbes does seem to overlook a “deeper sense” of freedom that most people consider necessary 
for moral responsibility.24 Also, it seems that we can rationally deliberate about courses of action 
                                                          
20 See Thomas Hobbes, British Moralists 1650-1800 Vol. 1, ed. D.D. Raphael (Indiana: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1991), 15. 
21 Hobbes, British Moralists, 16 
22 Hobbes, British Moralists, 15 
23 Contemporary philosophers of a more naturalist persuasion may be drawn to Hobbes’ account of freedom 
because of his sole reliance on empirical observation in his analysis of voluntary action. Contrary to this, 
Bramhall seems to give us a reconstruction of voluntary action that appeals to a rationalist faculty 
psychology—a branch of metaphysics that has few defenders in contemporary philosophy.    
24 Robert Kane captures this intuition perfectly: “It [an account of freedom like Hobbes] does seem to 
capture the surface freedom…These everyday freedoms do seems to amount to (1) the power or ability to do 
what we want (and the power to do otherwise, if we had wanted) and (2) doing so without any constraints or 
impediments getting in our way…[but] does it also capture the ‘deeper’ freedom of the will?” Robert Kane, A 
Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 14.  
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separate from our desires—something for which Hobbes’ conception of the will doesn’t have room. 
In what follows, I will consider David Hume’s attempt to put this controversy to rest. 
2.2  Hume on the Will, Necessity, and Liberty   
 In 1739, David Hume published the first two books of his A Treatise of Human Nature. 
Nestled in Book Two of the Treatise is Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity—a subject he 
revisited in 1748, with the publication of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume is 
commonly understood as being a Hobbesian about free will. Before further discussing how to 
interpret Hume on these matters, it is important to get clearer on the definitions he employs of “the 
will,” “necessity,” and “liberty” in his treatment of free will. 
 Hume expresses doubt about giving a concrete definition of “the will”: noting that “this 
impression…’tis impossible to define, and needless to describe any farther; for which reason we 
shall cut off all those definition and distinctions, with which philosophers are wont to perplex rather 
than clear up this question” (T, 2.3.1.2).  But, like Hobbes, he denies that it is the legislative faculty 
of the mind. Instead, Hume treats the will as the most salient of the “direct passions”—those 
impressions “which arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure” (T, 2.3.1.1). Other 
direct passions that Hume considers are desire and aversion. These passions are direct because they 
are fundamental experiences of pleasure and pain, the conjunction of which form “the chief spring 
or actuating principle of the human mind” (T, 3.3.1.2). One can see why Hume would say this. 
When one feels pleasure—say, upon listening to a Black Flag record—one experiences the desire to 
listen to Black Flag records. Likewise, when one feels pain—say, upon listening to the newest Yanni 
release—one experiences an aversion to listening to Yanni. But, the latter considerations make 
Hume’s classification of “the will” as a direct passion puzzling. Does the will derive from our 
affections of pain and pleasure? If so, this classification seems implausible because it would mean we 
become aware of our will though purely passive means; by being affected. 
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I take it that there is an alternative explanation. Hume defines the will as “the internal 
impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our 
body, or new perception of our mind” (T, 2.3.1.2). This definition leads us to believe that the will is 
not derived from our feelings of pleasure and pain, but forms the precondition of said feelings.25 Prior 
to experiencing the pleasure of listening to a Black Flag record, one experiences opening the record 
sleeve, taking the record out, putting it on the turntable, and placing the needle on the record. Along 
the way, one is conscious of one’s bodily movement, and one’s intent to listen to the record. The 
affection that accompanies one’s playing the record will depend on the content of playing the record. 
If it is a Black Flag record that one is playing, one will feel pleasure; if it is a Yanni record, one will 
feel pain. Either way, prior to the experience of desire or aversion, one is conscious of the basic 
physical and mental activities that compose one’s “playing the record”—that is to say, one is 
conscious of one’s own “will.” 
 In some ways, Hume’s account of the will resembles that of Hobbes. After all, Hume does 
not consider the the will to be, in Bramhall’s words, “the root, the fountain” of reason.26 Say that 
you deliberately decided to cheat on a test. Bramhall would explain your decision to cheat as follows: 
your rational will elected your desire to cheat on the test, and then dictated to the relevant faculties 
that they would enable you fulfill this desire. Hobbes considers this explanation to be nonsense. 
There is no election of the desire to cheat on the test that can be identified as “the will,” for the will is 
simply the appetite that moved you (necessarily) to cheat on the test. Nevertheless, Hobbes and 
Bramhall both agree that, under the above description, you have willed to cheat on the test. This is 
not the case for Hume. The will is not something that we have, properly speaking, as it is both 
                                                          
25 This interpretation is strengthened by Hume’s comment that “Of all the immediate effects of pain and 
pleasure, there is none more remarkable than the WILL; and tho’, properly speaking, it be not comprehended among 
the passions, yet as the full understanding of its nature and properties, is necessary to the explanation of them, we shall here 
make it the subject of our enquiry” (T, 2.3.1.2) [emphasis mine]. 
26 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 43. 
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constituted by and experienced through our various impressions of thought and action. My will is 
only transparent to me through its activity (in both acting and thinking), making the impression of 
willing, in some sense, epiphenomenal to acting or thinking itself. Hume remains agnostic about 
whether particular actions or thoughts are voluntary, as his solution to this problem presented in 
experience is to appeal to the concept of causal necessity.27 
Hume drastically parts from both Hobbes and Bramhall in claiming that we do not discover 
necessity, but experience it as a vivid impression received from a repeated course of events. Hume 
points out that the idea of necessity “arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations 
of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by 
custom to infer the one from the appearance to the other” (EHU, 64). The idea of causal necessity is 
composed of two parts: the experience of constant conjunction between perceptions, and an 
inference from one perception to the other. I notice that every time I drop a glass on my hardwood 
floor, the glass breaks. The dropping of the glass and the glass breaking are two separate 
perceptions, but they are constantly conjoined with one another: there is never a dropped glass 
perception without a broken glass perception. But constant conjunction is not sufficient for the idea 
of causal necessity: “besides that experience…we may establish the relation of priority by a kind of 
inference or reasoning” (T, 1.3.2.7). It is our experience of temporal priority of the “glass dropping” 
to the “glass breaking” that warrants the inference that the former caused the latter. The necessity of 
the causal inference derives from the repeated instances of the constant conjunction. We feel that 
the connection between the glass dropping and it breaking is necessary because the perceptions are 
                                                          
27 Hume expands on this topic in a footnote in the first Enquiry. He points out that, in performing actions we 
“have a false sensation or seeming experience…of liberty or indifference.” At the same time “we may 
observe, that, though, in reflecting on human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness, or indifference, but 
are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives” (EHU, 72, note 1). Our 
feeling of willing is inconclusive evidence for our voluntary willing. It appears that, for Hume, we need a 
stronger criterion than phenomenal experience to decide whether or not a particular action or thought is 
voluntary. This latter point sets his treatment of “the will” at odds with the accounts that Bramhall and 
Hobbes give.  
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constantly conjoined. As Hume points out, “this [necessary] connexion, therefore, which we feel in 
the mind, the customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the 
sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion” (EHU, 
59).  
It is easy to see how Hume applies the concept of causal necessity to natural objects. His 
more divisive claim is that the idea of causal necessity applies to human action as well. For Hume, 
we feel a necessary connexion between our beliefs and actions: “it appears not only that the 
conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as any part of nature, 
but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind” (EHU 
88). When I see my friend go to get a drink from the water fountain, I infer that she is thirsty. I 
automatically make this inference because I have seen others do so, and have done the same myself. 
Never do I find myself in a state of perplexity at the situation, for “the union betwixt motives and 
actions has the same constancy, as that in any natural operations” (T. 2.3.1.14). This transition from 
natural to human objects may seem to be unjustified, but remember that Hume provides us a 
psychological account of causal necessity. But because we make use of the same perceptual faculties 
to cognize both natural and human objects, Humean necessity (constant conjunction and causal 
inference) will apply equally to both. So what is it that enables human agents to enjoy liberty?  
Hume offers his canonical statement of liberty in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: 
“by liberty, then we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; 
that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this 
hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains” 
(EHU 73). Liberty requires that our actions be representative of our desires. If we enjoy liberty, then 
we have the ability to act in accordance with out desires. Hume’s account of liberty does not exclude 
causation, as the preconditions for liberty require that the action be caused by the agent’s desires; but 
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it does exclude compulsion, where this means impediments on the agent’s action separate from the 
agent’s desire. The conception of liberty Hume expresses here simply is the “liberty of spontaneity,” 
as discussed in the previous section. Like Hobbes, Hume argues that the liberty of spontaneity is the 
only plausible way of conceiving liberty. Bramhall’s resistance to this idea lies in his conflation of 
causation with compulsion: whereas the latter refers to external impediments to an agent exercising 
her will, the former refers to the internal mechanisms that make it the case that she acts at all. Rather 
than constraining us, the necessary connection between our actions and motives gives us (as well as 
other people) the ability to understand our actions as genuinely ours. Hume notes that “liberty [of 
indifference], by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing with chance” 
(T, 2.3.1.18). Our practices of holding each other responsible depend on the idea that our actions are 
necessarily linked with our motives; for if we cannot link motivation to action, we can never 
consider someone to be genuinely responsible for their actions. 
 
2.3 Classical Compatibilism and Hume 
 When it comes to the problem of free will, the vast majority of philosophers in the twentieth 
century have taken Hume to be Hobbesian. The label that philosophers have introduced to capture 
both of their views is classical compatibilism. As we established, a compatibilist like Hobbes or Hume 
maintains that liberty, properly construed, is compatible with the doctrine of necessity. Classical 
compatibilism, represented most definitively by Hobbes, defines liberty as the ability to choose 
spontaneously. Contemporary philosophers present Hobbesian liberty as having two parts: a “power or 
ability requirement” and an “absence of constraint requirement.”28 For the classical compatibilist, S 
is free to Φ iff S has the ability to Φ and S’s attempt to Φ is not interfered with. Because classical 
compatibilism defines “liberty” within the bounds of “necessity,” an agent’s voluntary action is 
always subject to the laws of causal necessity. What makes an agent’s action voluntary is not that it 
                                                          
28 Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 14-15 
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lies outside the jurisdiction of necessary causal laws, but that the determination of his action flows 
from his will and not from the will of others. Instead of directly answering the incompatibilist 
challenge to provide a genuine account of action election, classical compatibilism attempts to modify 
the grounds of the debate by shifting the conversation from voluntary willing to voluntary action. 
Because of this, the incompatibilist charges that the compatibilist has missed the point: if one cannot 
elect one’s action then one’s action cannot be considered voluntary. In response, the compatibilist 
argues that the incompatibilist is simply confused about the nature of liberty: to will voluntarily 
simply is the ability to act as one chooses.  
 How does classical compatibilism apply more specifically to what Hume says about free will? 
Paul Russell presents three “arguments” that Hume puts forth in both the Treatise and the first 
Enquiry to highlight the spirit of the classical compatibilist interpretation. Russell calls the first 
argument the necessity argument—the conclusion of which states that causal necessity is nothing but 
“the constant conjunction of objects and the inference of the mind from one object to the other.”29 
The necessity argument is conjoined with two liberty arguments, the first of which Russell refers to as 
the spontaneity argument. The spontaneity argument claims that “voluntary action is to be 
distinguished from involuntary action not by the absence of necessitation (as is suggested by the 
liberty of indifference), but rather by a different type of cause.”30 The second liberty argument is the 
antilibertarian argument, which concludes that the liberty of indifference, if actual, would abolish the 
possibility of free actions.31 The three arguments, taken as a whole, constitute Humean classical 
compatibilism according to Russell. Liberty and necessity are taken to be compatible with one 
another because liberty, properly construed, consists solely in the ability to do as one chooses. My 
decision to learn how to ride a bike may be causally necessitated by my desire not to be made fun of 
                                                          
29 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 11 
30 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 13 
31 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 12 
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by my peers; but insofar as my desire is genuinely mine, the fact that this desire necessitated my 
decision to learn how to ride a bike does not render my action involuntary.32 Likewise, consider if 
my desire not to be made fun of by my peers did not causally necessitate my decision to learn how 
to ride a bike. What if my action could not be causally linked to any of my desires, wishes, 
intentions, etc? Would we choose to call my action voluntary? Hume does not think we would. A 
tight causal link between my motives and my action seems, perhaps counterintuitively, to be required 
for liberty. 
 Russell claims that the classical compatibilist approach to free will is rationalist in two 
senses.33 First, classical compatibilism is concerned with the logic of concepts we make use of in 
discussion about freedom and moral responsibility, a strategy Russell says involves “a priori 
reflections about the meanings of the terms involved.”34 That is to say, the classical compatibilist makes 
use of conceptual analysis in his treatment of free will, with the aim to clearing up any linguistic 
confusion that impedes the debate. As Russell points out, the classical compatibilist argues that it is 
“because we confuse [our concepts of] causation with force and compulsion we mistakenly conclude 
that freedom (and responsibility) requires the absence of causation and necessity.”35 The second 
sense in which Russell takes classical compatibilism to be rationalist is in its treatment of the 
“problem of moral responsibility” as reducible to the “problem of free will.” For the classical 
compatibilist, to be morally responsible just is to be free. As Russell puts it, advocates of classical 
                                                          
32 As Hobbes points out: “liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the 
nature and instrinsical quality of an agent,” Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 38. 
33 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 171. Here, it is important to not conflate the form of “rationalism” that 
Russell is concerned with and the “rationalism” that people often speak of in discussions of Early Modern 
philosophy. Russell is not claiming that Hume is a rationalist in the sense that Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza 
are thought to be. Instead, he argues that Hume qua classical compatibilist interpretation is a rationalist in the 
sense that he approaches the free will problem with the tool-kit of something like conceptual analysis. Russell 
contrasts this latter form of rationalism with naturalism, which “relies on empirical observations regarding the 
nature and circumstances, or moral psychology, involved in actual ascriptions of moral responsibility” in its 
treatment of free will. See Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 14. 
34 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 14 
35 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 4 
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compatibilism believe that “any adequate interpretation and discussion of moral responsibility must 
begin with, or develop out of, some relevant and appropriate account of the nature of moral 
freedom.”36 In order to be responsible, we have to be free; and in order to be free, we have to act 
voluntarily. Russell claims that Hume parts from classical compatibilism on both of these points: 
approaching the problems of freedom and moral responsibility from the perspective of naturalism, 
and not rationalism. I will discuss Russell’s alternate interpretation in the following chapter.  
 The popularity of classical compatibilism has waned in recent years due to pressure from 
more sophisticated forms of incompatibilism. And one can see why. Going back to the example I 
used previously in my discussion of Bramhall: it doesn’t seem to be the case that Bob the drug 
addict is free in his robbing of the bank simply because he both acts from a desire and enjoys non-
interference in his action. Bob suffers from an addiction that blocks his ability to elect possible 
desires and actions. Any theory of freedom that considers Bob’s spontaneous action to be voluntary 
must be impoverished. It follows that if we take classical compatibilism to be representative of 
Hume’s position on freedom and moral responsibility, we should conclude, along with Russell, that 
“Hume’s thinking on this subject is now dated and somewhat passé.”37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 11 
37 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 4 
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3. NATURALIZING THE PROBLEM: PAUL RUSSELL ON HUME 
 
 
3.1 The Regularity Theory of Causation 
 
In his book, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume’s Ways of Naturalizing Moral Responsibility, Paul 
Russell argues that the classical compatibilist interpretation of Hume is flawed on two grounds. First, 
he claims that Hume’s concept of causal necessity (constant conjunction and inference of the mind) 
undermines the classical compatibilist account of liberty (liberty of spontaneity). Second, Russell 
argues that the classical compatibilist interpretation fails to recognize the central role the passions 
play in Hume’s account of moral responsibility. On account of these criticisms, Russell concludes 
that Hume eschews the rationalism of classical compatibilism for a more naturalistic approach to the 
problems of free will and moral responsibility. In this section, I will only be concerned with Russell’s 
first criticism of the classical compatibilist interpretation.  
Russell argues that Hume holds a regularity theory of causation, which he differentiates from 
a metaphysical theory of causation—where the latter is understood as giving an account of the causal 
structure of the world, and the former is taken to give an account of our perceptions of that world.38 
One can see why Russell would attribute a regularity theory of causation to him; after all, Hume 
claims that “the mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly 
reach any experience of their connexion with objects” (EHU, 119). Hume explicitly refrains from 
making judgments about various “powers” or “forces” that underlie our perception of constant 
conjunction (EHU, 50). And so, following Russell’s reasoning, Hume simply cannot accept a 
metaphysical theory of causation. Hume appears to be much more interested in the psychology of 
causation and causal inference. As Russell points out, for Hume “the connexion we think of as 
holding between cause and effect turns out to be the same as that which holds between our 
                                                          
38 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 47 
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perceptions whereby one idea naturally introduces the other. Thus, the necessary connexion turns 
out to be an association between our perceptions.”39 It is an account of how this process of 
association functions that Hume is concerned to give in his treatment of causation (EHU, 59).  
Classical compatibilism, according to Russell, presupposes a metaphysical theory of the 
causation. The classical compatibilist account of freedom, the liberty of spontaneity, distinguishes 
between those causes that are internal to the agent (desires, intentions, etc.) and those that are external 
to him (laws of nature, etc.). For a classical compatibilist to consider an action to be voluntary, it must 
be the case that the action was the result of a necessary, internal cause. Russell claims that because 
Hume defines causal necessity in terms of our perceptions, and not objects, our causal inferences are 
limited to saying that two perceptions are regularly conjoined. For this reason, Russell argues that 
Hume does not have the resources to establish that a particular action was the result of an agent’s 
motives or desires, and thus he is unable to discover whether or not the action in question was truly 
voluntary: “the liberty argument presupposes that any adequate theory of responsibility must 
establish that agents produce or determine their actions, and are thereby, connected with their deeds. 
The necessity argument suggests that there exist only constant conjunctions between these objects 
(i.e., willings and actions) and that these constant conjunctions do not reveal or uncover any power 
or agency in any cause, nor any connexions between cause and effect.”40  
Russell argues that a result of Hume’s regularity theory of causation is that it commits him to 
the “double-ontology of existence” thesis. There are two components to this view: first, that “we 
naturally suppose that there exists a material world of bodies and that they operate on one another 
‘independent of our thought and reasoning’”; and second, that “in ordinary life we ‘confound 
perceptions and objects’ and thereby naturally ‘transfer’ those connexions which we ‘feel’ between 
                                                          
39 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 31 
40 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 55 
 18 
our perceptions to the bodies (i.e. bodies) themselves.”41 We believe that a world exists separate 
from our perceptions of it, but we understand that we only have knowledge of this world through 
our perceptual faculties. Our belief in the external world is central to our understanding, since “we 
must take it for granted in all of our reasonings” (T, 1.4.2.1). To put it in Strawsonian terms, the 
belief in an external world is a commitment of ours.42 As a result of this commitment, and because we 
recognize (at least when we are being careful with our reasoning) that our perceptions fail to tell us 
anything about the world apart from the functioning of these faculties, we are stuck with two 
realities.43  
 At times, Hume does seem to assert the double-ontology of existence thesis: “philosophy 
informs us, that every thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception, and is 
interrupted, and dependent on the mind; whereas the vulgar confound perceptions and objects” (T, 
1.4.2.14). However, I propose that Hume’ distinction between perceptions and their objects is 
epistemological and not metaphysical. Consider his discussion of skepticism in the Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding. Hume derides Cartesian skepticism because it eliminates the possibility of 
human knowledge: “the Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any 
human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring 
                                                          
41 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 46 
42 P.F. Strawson speaks of Hume’s affirmation of the existence of an external world as an “unavoidable 
natural conviction, commitment, or prejudice [that is] ineradicably implanted in our minds by Nature.” P.F. 
Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 19. Earlier, 
in the same work, he notes that “his [Hume’s] point is really the very simple one that, whatever arguments 
may be produced on one side or the other of the question, we simply cannot help believing in the existence of 
body,” 11. 
43 One need not conclude with Russell that there is a metaphysical distinction between “objects” and “bodies” 
for Hume. Instead, one could claim, along with Strawson, “Hume, then, we may say, is ready to accept and to 
tolerate a distinction between two levels of thought: the level of philosophically critical thinking which can 
offer us no assurances against skepticism; and the level of everyday empirical thinking, at which the 
pretension of critical thinking are completely overridden and suppressed by Nature,” Skepticism and Naturalism: 
Some Varieties, 13. Later, Strawson refers to these “levels of thought” as standpoints that one can take, neither 
of which is opposed to one another: “the appearance of a contradiction arises only if we assume the existence 
of some metaphysically absolute standpoint from which we can judge between the two standpoints,” 39. The 
distinction between the two levels of thought—skepticism and naturalism—is not a metaphysical distinction 
then. I will make another version of this point against Russell in Chapter 3.  
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us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject” (EHU, 116). Hume finds this conclusion 
distasteful, and proposes a more mitigated form of skepticism—represented by the Ancient Greek 
schools. The latter form of skepticism urges that “the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended 
on; but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by consideration, derived from the nature 
of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposition of the organ, in order to render them, 
within their sphere, the proper criteria of truth and falsehood” (EHU, 117). Surely this more ancient 
form of skepticism recognizes a gap between perceptions and their objects, but it is an 
epistemological gap, and not a metaphysical one. The skeptical schools are meant to teach us 
moderation in our causal inferences; not that such inferences are impossible.  
The problem with the double-ontology of existence thesis, on a philosophical level, is simply 
stated: if the distinction between “objects” and “perceptions” is a metaphysical one, and not merely an 
epistemological one, then we have no criterion by which to judge the extent to which our perceptions 
of objects “hook up” with the objects themselves. Further, Russell’s interpretation of Hume’s 
account of causation as a regularity theory is equally problematic on Humean grounds. If causal 
inferences lie at the base of all knowledge claims about matter of fact as Hume thinks they do (T, 
1.3.2), and our inferences can only pick out “regularities,” then we have no rule to demarcate correct 
causal inferences from incorrect ones. Yet, Hume assumes that “there be no such thing as chance in 
the world,” and thus commits himself to the view that there are correct causal inferences to be made 
(EHU, 46). I explore this topic further in Chapter 3, section 2. 
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3.2  Feeling Naturalism 
 Russell argues that the classical compatibilist interpretation fails to take into account the 
central role the moral sentiments play in Hume’s account of moral responsibility. The moral 
sentiments are central to what Russell calls Hume’s naturalization of the problems of free will and 
moral responsibility. Russell parses naturalism in two ways: scientific naturalism and feeling 
naturalism. Whereas classical compatibilism claims that an agent is morally responsible if her action 
is voluntary, feeling naturalism maintains that an agent is morally responsible if she is the object of a 
sentiment of approbation or disapprobation. Likewise, while classical compatibilism approaches the 
problem of free will with the tools of conceptual analysis, scientific naturalism undertakes an “a 
posteriori project of describ[ing] the circumstances under which people are felt to be responsible.”44 In 
this section, I will be concerned with feeling naturalism component of Russell’s interpretation. 
Central to Russell’s interpretation of Hume as a “feeling naturalist” is his reading of Hume’s account 
of the passions. Before we get into Russell’s interpretation of the Humean passions, it is necessary to 
lay some groundwork.45 
 Hume distinguishes between two kinds of passions: calm and violent. Calm passions concern 
“beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects,” while the violent passions are 
those of “love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility” (T, 2.1.1.3). The difference between the 
two is one of vivacity. Hume makes a further distinction between direct and indirect passions. The 
direct passions (desire, aversion, grief, joy, etc.) are those which “arise immediately from good or evil, 
from pain or pleasure,” while indirect passions (pride, humility, ambition, vanity, etc.) are those that 
                                                          
44 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 65 
45 The following account of the passions, though detailed, will become especially important for my treatment 
of Russell’s interpretation of Hume in Chapter 3. 
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“proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities” (T, 2.1.2.4).46 The 
qualities that Hume speaks of here are explained by the principles of association: contiguity, 
resemblance, cause and effect.47 One can see why Hume would make this distinction between direct 
and indirect passions. If I see an apple on a table and remember that I receive pleasure from eating 
apples, ceteris paribus, I may desire to grab the apple and eat it. However, I will never experience guilt at 
my eating the apple unless it was the case that the apple belonged to someone else: that is to say, 
unless my passion of desire can be mediated through another person’s feeling of disapprobation at 
wrongly eating the apple (i.e., they did not give me permission to eat it, etc.). Indirect passions are 
then, at bottom, social passions.48  
 The indirect passions consist of two parts: the object of the passion (self, other, natural 
object), and the sensation that accompanies the passion (pain or pleasure). A specific passion is 
produced by a “double relation of ideas and impressions,” whereby the “cause, which excites the 
passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the 
cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion” (T, 2.1.5.5). Say I feel pity for a 
friend who has just lost her father. The sensation (impression) of the passion is pain, while the object of 
                                                          
46 Hume also includes “the will” in his account of the direct passions (2.3.1). But, as I argued in the previous 
chapter, there is reason to believe that he takes the will to be a necessary component of one’s experience of the 
direct passions, but not as one of the direct passions themselves.  
47 See Treatise, 1.1.4. Hume claims that the relationship between passions (say, between malice and pride) 
functions according to associations of resemblance: “nature has bestow’d a kind of attraction on certain 
impressions and ideas, by which one of them, upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative” (T, 
2.1.5.10). That said, all indirect passions “require the existence of some foreign object, and that the organs, 
which produce it, exert not themselves like the heart and arteries, by an original internal movement” (T, 
2.1.5.7). It follows from this that associations of cause and effect are required for the function of our indirect 
passions, and so the latter are then dependent on the tools of causal inference.  One cannot feel pride about 
the state of one’s garden unless it is also true that one believes that (1) one’s garden is one’s own, and (2) that 
there is a necessary connexion between the state of one’s garden and it being one’s own. Otherwise, the 
passions of pride would be improper.  
48 Annette Baier makes the case that direct passions are also social.  She finds evidence for this in the fact that 
Hume treats the indirect passions before the direct passions in the Treatise, which leads her to believe that 
Hume treats the direct passions as “abstractions” from our more social indirect passion. This is not to say 
that Baier thinks direct passions reduce to indirect passions; it is just that the former are dependent on the 
latter for their existence.  I will pursue this line of thought further in Chapter 3. See A Progress of Sentiments, 
133-135. Baier makes a similar point about the relation between impressions and ideas: see 34-35. 
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the passion is my friend (idea). The cause of my pity was her father dying. This cause produced an 
independent feeling of pain (impression), which was then bolstered by the fact that the death was of 
my friend’s father (idea). The relation of these two ideas and impression created the passion “pity 
for my friend on account of the death of her father” in me. Notice that Hume is claiming that we 
feel pain on two fronts: the fact of death, and the fact that it was my friend’s father who died. This 
may seem unlikely, until one takes into account the central role that sympathy plays in Hume’s 
account of the indirect passions: “no quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and 
in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by 
communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our 
own” (T, 2.1.11.2). Because we naturally sympathize with our fellows, news of the death of 
someone’s father will cause us pain, even if the pain is minimal. However, this pain receives 
“additional weight and authority” when affixed to the idea of my friend (T, 2.1.12.19).  
 The moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation—the constituents of Humean moral 
judgments—are classified as calm, indirect passions.49 These passions comprise the distinction 
between virtue and vice: when one’s sentiment of approbation is directed at the conduct or character 
of another agent, we judge that the agent is virtuous; when an agent is the object of our 
disapprobation, we deem him vicious. But, while our moral sentiments may take another agent’s 
action as its object—say, an agent’s giving to charity—Hume claims that “if any action be either 
virtuous or vicious, ‘tis only as a sign of some quality of character. It must depend upon durable 
principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter in the personal character” 
(T, 3.3.1.4). That is to say: when we deem someone virtuous on account of her giving to charity, we 
                                                          
49 There is controversy concerning whether or not Hume can rightfully speak of “moral judgments,” as he 
argues at length that “the approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not deriv’d from reason, or any 
comparison of ideas; but proceeds entirely from a moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or 
disgust” (T, 3.3.1.15). I will speak of moral judgments because this is the language that Russell employs. I also 
happen to believe, contrary to what may seem to be the case, that Hume’s account of responsibility attribution 
is best cast in the language of moral judgment.  
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are making a judgment about her character; namely, that she is benevolent. If we knew this agent to 
be a prideful person, we may judge her conduct differently; we may judge that she gave to charity out 
of self-interest. In the latter case, Hume thinks that we would be hesitant to praise her action. This 
fact shows that our moral sentiments are ultimately directed at an agent’s character, and though 
“actions are, indeed, better indications of a character than words, or even wishes and sentiments; but 
‘tis only so far as they are such indications, that they are attended with love or hatred, praise or 
blame” (T, 3.3.1.5).  
 According to Russell, Hume’s account of the passions is a “feeling theory.”50 On this view, 
the violent, amoral, passions (love, hate, etc.) are distinguished from the calm, moral, passions based 
on how they feel to the agent.51 Say I feel love towards myself, and hatred towards another. Russell 
reads Hume as making the following point: my self-directed love will feel differently than my other-
directed hatred, and so we can know that love and hatred are different passions. Further insight into 
the relation between the calm and violent passions will be received from considerations about the 
kind of effect they have on us, for we may “infer them from the behavior they have aroused in us.”52 
The latter is centrally important to understanding the calm passions because they are “so soft an 
emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible” (T. 2.1.1.3). It follows that, though we can 
distinguish between violent and calm passion on account of the feelings they produce in us, when it 
                                                          
50 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 88 
51 Russell notes that “Hume’s feeling theory of emotion commits him to the view that the moral sentiments 
feel different from all other passions and that this sui generis constitutes the very nature or essence of moral 
sentiment.” Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 89. I take it that Russell’s classification of Hume as a 
proponent of the “feeling theory” here is misguided because he takes “feeling” to be phenomenological and 
not somatic. The traditional formulation of the “feeling theory,” presented by William James and Carl G. 
Lange, stated that emotions were to be defined on the basis of certain effects they were having on the body: 
“we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and [it is] not that we cry, 
strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.” See William James, “What is an 
Emotion?” Mind, 9: 188–205. The “feeling theory” maps onto Russell’s second formulation of Hume’s view: 
that the passions may be defined on the basis of the effect they have on the body, but not the first 
formulation: that emotions are sensations. Because the latter view is utterly inane, we have reason to believe 
that Russell is engaged in hyperbole against Hume. 
52 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 90 
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comes to kinds of calm passions, we can only differentiate between them on the basis of 
physiological or behavioral evidence.  
 Likewise, when we are trying to infer the existence of a particular passion (either violent or 
calm) in another agent, we will only have physical evidence to draw our inferences from, as we 
cannot share in the feelings of another. This is precisely why Hume takes the consideration of 
conduct to be so centrally important to understanding others: “when I see the effects of passion in 
the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, 
and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself” (T, 
3.3.1.6). It is the passion that motivated the person’s conduct, and not the conduct itself, that 
produces a feeling of approbation or disapprobation in us. If we see someone kick a dog, and infer 
that they did so in order to get the dog out of the road (lest it get hit by a car), we will feel differently 
about him than if we infer that he kicked the dog out of malice.  
 We do not receive praise or censure on the basis of our actions themselves (even our 
intentional ones). Instead, it is our actions that reveal stable or enduring character traits that subject 
us to moral sentiment. On Russell’s reading of Hume, we are “responsible for [our] character in the 
sense that it is (beliefs about) character that generates moral sentiment.”53 This does not require that 
we have actively shaped our character: we can be held responsible for who we are regardless of 
whether or not the traits that constitute us were voluntarily chosen. Russell finds evidence for this 
reading in Hume’s treatment of excusing conditions, or the conditions under which we let someone off 
the hook, morally speaking. He claims that “Hume holds that excusing conditions must be explained 
or accounted for with reference to character.”54 So, when we excuse someone for her conduct, we 
must always do so on basis that the action in question was incongruous with the character that we 
know the agent to have. For example, if your friend was known to be kind, we may excuse a 
                                                          
53 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 124 
54 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 102 
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particular outburst he made under pressure because we understand that it did not reflect the 
kindness we know him to have. Though we could let your friend off for his “out of character” 
conduct, we could not let him off the hook for his character. According to Russell then, Hume is not 
concerned with the voluntary or involuntary nature of the character in question, but with the 
“character doing the acting.”55  
 Nevertheless, Russell argues that this does not mean that Hume does not concern himself 
with moral freedom. If a person were forced to shoot the president because an evil neuroscientist 
was controlling the firing of his neurons, we would consider her action involuntary, and her 
character untainted. But, as Russell points out, the moral sentiments reach beyond matters of 
conduct, and take character traits or qualities of mind as their objects as well: “feeling and desires, 
even though they might never engage the will or direct our intentions, are distinct and vital 
indications or signs of a person’s character and qualities of mind, and, as such, they are quite capable 
of arousing moral sentiments toward that person.”56 It follows from this that there can be moral 
judgments about involuntary, or non-willed, aspects of one’s character.57 Russell takes this fact to 
prove that the liberty of spontaneity is not a necessary condition of being taken as object of the 
sentiments of approbation or disapprobation, and so that “the sphere of responsibility, therefore, 
extends beyond the sphere of action and liberty of spontaneity.”58  
 I do think that Russell’s criticism of the classical compatibilist interpretation is right. Clearly, 
Hume’s account of the passions is central to his theory of moral responsibility. However, I disagree 
with him on two fronts. First, I am skeptical of Russell’s “feeling theory” interpretation of the 
Human passions, which amounts to a descriptive story of various reactions, almost chemical in nature, 
                                                          
55 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 102 
56 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 119 
57 Russell notes that “on Hume’s account, there are other channels, independent of will and intention, 
through which an agent can reveal her moral character and qualities of mind,” Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 
119. 
58 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 119 
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firing in our minds; reactions that have no necessary connections to the objects they are meant to be 
reactions of. I am willing to grant that Hume is a “sentimentalist” about moral responsibility, but not 
that he holds a “feeling theory” of the passions. Second, I am skeptical of Russell’s claim that Hume 
considers the sphere of moral responsibility to extend beyond considerations of freedom. Perhaps 
the sphere extends beyond the “liberty of spontaneity,” but I argue that it does not extend past 
freedom itself. I expand on both of these points in Chapter 3.  
 
3.3  Scientific Naturalism 
 The classical compatibilist, or philosophical rationalist more generally, looks at the problems 
of free will and moral responsibility and asks two questions: “are the concepts we are working with 
coherent?” and “do these concepts apply to human beings?” Contrary to rationalist, the scientific 
naturalist starts not with the concepts, but with the facts of the case.59 The naturalist looks to our 
social lives and discovers that we naturally hold one another responsible. It is a fact, as Russell puts it, 
that “men regard other people as objects of praise or blame—that is, they hold them responsible.”60 
It is also the case that people automatically draw inferences about one another’s character by taking 
their conduct as evidence. When we see someone steal, we naturally search for the motives that 
pushed him do so; and from these motives, we decide whether or not the stealing was blameworthy 
or praiseworthy. It is the conjunction of these two facts—that we naturally hold one another 
responsible, and that we automatically infer a person’s motivations from their actions—that explains 
our concept of “moral responsibility.” For the naturalist, our concept of responsibility is no more in 
need of justification than our concept of friendship is. As Russell points out, “naturalists do not ask 
‘Does the concept of responsibility have any application to human beings?’ Rather, they ask, ‘Do the 
attitudes, sentiments, and practices which are constitutive of responsibility have any adequate or proper 
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justification?”61 A naturalist philosopher may seek to reform a particular conception of responsibility 
on the grounds that it does not cohere with what we know about ourselves and the world, but he 
cannot reform the concept of responsibility itself; not without drastically redefining what it is to be 
us.  
 So how does the scientific naturalism approach the problem of free will?  As we saw in the 
previous section, to hold someone responsible for Hume is to “regard them as the object of a 
certain kind of passion—namely, a moral sentiment.”62 It is a fact that we do hold one another 
responsible. It also appears that, when we hold someone responsible, our moral sentiments are 
directed at their motivation or character, and not their action itself. We feel differently when an agent 
maliciously runs someone over with their vehicle, as opposed to when she does so accidently. We may 
accuse the latter person of gross negligence, while we will consider the former character to be 
vicious. As Russell points out, if we did not have the ability to attribute motivations to people, we 
would not be able to come to a decision about whether the person should be held responsible: 
“without knowledge of anyone’s character, no sentiment of approbation or blame would be aroused 
in us. Therefore, without inference, no one would be an object of praise or blame—that is to say, no 
one would be regarded as responsible for her actions.”63 This fact also requires that an agent’s 
motives and her actions be fixed together in some way. If there were no regular connection between 
what an agent did, and what she intended to do, she could not rightfully be held responsible for her 
conduct. I draw to conclusions from this. First, Humean necessity (constant conjunction and mental 
inference) is “psychologically essential to ascriptions of responsibility, because in the absence of the 
relevant regularities and inferences, the regular mechanism which produces our moral sentiments 
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would simply fail to function.”64 And second, “liberty of spontaneity is (psychologically) essential to 
responsibility because it is only in these circumstances (i.e., in which we discover constant 
conjunctions between motives and actions) that it is possible for us to draw the specific kinds of 
inferences required to generate the moral sentiments.”65  Russell sees a modern proponent of the 
scientific naturalism in P.F. Strawson. 
 In his 1962 article “Freedom and Resentment,” P.F. Strawson claims that the two 
interlocutors in the free will debate—whom he labels the optimists and the pessimists—have 
reached an impasse. The pessimist, a card-carrying incompatibilist, asserts that determinism is true 
and that, as a result, we are not free. It follows from this conclusion, the pessimist argues, that “our 
concepts of moral obligation and responsibility really have no application, and the practices of 
praising and blaming, of expressing moral condemnation and approval, are really unjustified.”66 
Conversely, the optimist, a classical compatibilist of sorts, agrees with the pessimist that determinism 
is true, but she claims that our concepts of freedom and moral responsibility “in no way lose their 
raison d'être” because of the utility they serve in making moral judgments and doling out punishments 
for harmful acts.67  
 Strawson argues that we should bracket, at least for the time being, the question of 
determinism and its impact on free will. Instead, we should focus our attention on what he calls the 
reactive attitudes: those “non-detached attitudes and reactions of people directly involved in 
transaction with each other; of the attitudes and reactions of offended parties and beneficiaries; of 
such things as gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings.”68 It is these attitudes, 
Strawson argues, and not our philosophical concepts of “freedom” and “moral responsibility” that 
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give form to our actual practices of taking one another as free and holding one another morally 
responsible. If my friend steals my bike, I may feel resentment towards him. For Strawson, my 
resentment is constitutive of my holding him responsible for stealing the bike. There is no need for 
me to reference my theory of free will to decide whether or not my friend was really responsible; my 
resentment has already done this. But what is the justification of my resentment? According to 
Strawson, there need not be any external justification for my reactive attitude. It is simply a fact about 
our nature that we attach a great importance to the “attitudes and intention [directed] towards us of 
those who stand in these relations to us and the great extent to which our personal feelings and 
reactions depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions.”69 In other 
words: in virtue of our humanity, we are committed to these reactive attitudes insofar as they give 
form to our social lives. 
 Of course, someone may claim that we ought not to be committed to our reactive attitudes. 
Perhaps I spent the afternoon after my friend stole my bike reading Spinoza, and I came across the 
following passage: “in nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from 
the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.”70 I think to myself: 
“I should not feel resentment towards my friend because, after all, he was determined to steal the 
bike.” In thinking this, I have decided to take the theoretical point of view towards my friend, 
treating him as an object of analytic study, and not the proper object of reactive attitudes. But in 
order to take this viewpoint seriously, I realize that it must be universalized, for insofar as my friend is 
exempt from the reactive attitudes on determinist grounds, he shares this feature with all people, 
including myself. Should I take my “theoretical point of view” to its logical conclusion and exempt 
all people from the reactive attitudes?  
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Strawson rejects this course of action on two grounds. First, he finds it psychologically 
inconceivable: “we cannot, as we are, seriously envisage ourselves adopting a thoroughgoing 
objectivity of attitude to others as a result of theoretical conviction of the truth of determinism.”71 
Although we may have the capability to take the “theoretical stance” in particular cases, we simply 
cannot maintain it with regard to the whole of humanity because our interpersonal relationships, 
which provide ultimate meaning to our lives, are predicated on the employment of the reactive 
attitudes. Second, Strawson claims that when “we do in fact adopt such an attitude in a particular 
case, our doing so is not the consequence of a theoretical conviction which might be expressed as 
‘determinism in this case’, but is a consequence of our abandoning, for different reasons in different 
cases, the ordinary inter-personal attitudes.”72 Take the example of a man named Bob who has 
damage to his amygdala. Bob is inclined to take abnormally large risks, which leads him to gamble 
most of his money away at the roulette table. We do not consider Bob to be the proper object of 
our reactive attitudes, but not because he is determined; instead, we judge him thusly because he is 
deficient in some way.  
 For Russell, the key point of scientific naturalism lies in the fact that “both these thinkers 
[Hume and Strawson], in different ways, shift emphasis and attention from problems of freedom to 
problems of responsibility. Instead of arguing that we interpret responsibility in terms of freedom, it 
is suggested that we try to understand the conditions of freedom in terms of an empirically better 
informed theory of responsibility.”73 The concept of moral freedom that Hume defends—the liberty 
of spontaneity—does not provide a precondition for moral responsibility. Instead, this notion of 
freedom is something that we arrive at through an analysis of the functioning our moral sentiments. 
It turns out that in order to make sense of moral responsibility, we need to presuppose something 
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like a non-metaphysical version of the liberty of spontaneity. This naturalistic line of reasoning takes 
Hume far from the previously considered classical compatibilist interpretation.  
 Unlike the construal of Hume as a feeling naturalist, I tend to agree with Russell’s construal of 
him as a scientific naturalist. That said, I argue that the particular kind of scientific naturalism that 
Russell saddles Hume with is overly reductive, being focused more on the internal bare form, or 
mechanical functioning of the moral sentiments than with their social content, or the ways in which 
they are shaped by our interactions with one another. In this way, I think Hume is even closer to 
Strawson than Russell even realizes.  
 
3.4 Does Hume Solve the Free Will Problem? 
 
 Russell takes Hume’s commitment to naturalism (in both its feeling and scientific senses) to be 
laudable in a number of respects. He praises Hume for recognizing that our concepts of freedom 
and moral responsibility are not the products of metaphysical inquiry, but are a given of human 
nature itself. Russell also finds Hume’s naturalism to be delightfully impervious to a form of moral 
skepticism.74 Nevertheless, he argues that Hume’s specific, naturalist account of freedom and moral 
responsibility is deeply flawed because he is unable to give a justificatory account of the moral 
sentiments. 
 Hume’s account of the passions is central to his concept of moral responsibility. On 
Russell’s reading, the account that Hume provides includes descriptive analysis of how our 
sentiments function, but leaves out a proper justification of their functioning. But, for Russell, “the 
philosopher’s concern should not be with the mechanics which generate peculiar, atomistic 
sensation. It is rather, the cognitive-evaluative features involved in ascribing responsibility which 
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should be the philosopher’s principal concern.”75 Because Hume fails to account for any cognitive-
evaluative content of our passions, he is not able to explain how we can properly attribute 
responsibility to ourselves and others by way of the passions. Russell claims that it follows from this 
inability to distinguish between proper and improper functioning of the passions that Hume’s account 
of moral responsibility is not satisfactory.  
 Russell argues that Hume’s appeal to the “calm” passions will not rescue his account of 
moral responsibility. For, as with the “violent” passions, the calm passion is determined either by 
reference to the feeling that arises in us upon experiencing it, or by the effect that it has on us 
(physiologically or behaviorally speaking). The former is not helpful for discerning the nature of a 
calm passion because, as Hume notes, “tho’ they [the calm passions] be real passions, [they] produce 
little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by their immediate feeling or 
sensation” (T, 2.3.4.9). We are left with the latter option. But, because different effects could result 
from like passions—a passion of disapprobation may lead one agent to censure an offender, while it 
may lead another agent to assault him—Russell argues, 
 We need to know more about the beliefs and evaluations that give rise to the hostile 
 behavior and conduct. Furthermore, it seems clear that the behavior and attitudes 
 appropriate to the moral sentiment must be interpreted as expressions of beliefs and 
 evaluations rather than simply as expressions  of sui generis sensations. In this way, in order 
 to infer the presence of (calm) moral  sentiments—either in our own case or in the minds of 
 others—we need to be able to  identify the beliefs and evaluations which are expressed by 
 the conduct and behavior of the persons who maintain these sentiments.76 
 
Our ability to identify the various beliefs and evaluations that are expressed by an agent’s conduct 
presupposes that we have an adequate account of her character. That way we are able to recognize a 
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particular performance as somehow representative of an enduring quality or character trait she 
possesses.   
 Russell argues that this is exactly what Hume fails to provide: an adequate account of moral 
character. One’s “character” is defined in terms of the various “traits” one possesses. These 
character traits are defined as an enduring set of passions. But, as Russell points out, “an 
understanding of a person’s character in these terms generally involves identifying the ways in which 
the various passions are related to each other and shape the person’s will.”77 It is not enough to be 
able to identify the various character traits that one has, for to give a full account of one’s 
“character” is to understand how these traits fit together and inform one’s actions. Despite the fact 
that we always infer a person’s character from his actions, Russell stresses we cannot only count on 
action description to grasp a person’s character. An agent may have various character traits that do 
not intentionally manifest themselves. Consider someone that is a naturally short-tempered person, 
but is gifted with the quality of “strength of mind.” She is able to control her temper, but she is never 
able to rid herself of the trait: that trait would still be considered part of her character, even if it was 
also true to say about her that she is strong of mind. Because all character traits create feelings of 
pleasure and pain in others, her character could still be an object of disapprobation. It follows, 
Russell argues, that people are ultimately held accountable just on account of how others react to 
their actions. The result is that, “quite apart from anything else, this approach [Hume’s “feeling 
naturalism”] leaves us entirely unable to say why some people are not appropriate objects of moral 
sentiment. Hume provides us with no adequate account of the nature of moral capacities required 
for a person (or creature) to be deemed an appropriate object of moral sentiment.”78  
 Hume needs a way to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate functioning of our 
moral sentiments. His account of moral freedom, the liberty of spontaneity, may provide the 
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necessary criterion for making such a distinction. But, as we have seen, the liberty of spontaneity 
suffers from major problems. All that the liberty of spontaneity provides us with is the ability to 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions on account of the kind of connection that exists 
between an agent’s action and his character. But what if an agent’s character is involuntary? What if 
it comes to pass that one can have little influence over the nature of one’s character? If so, then a 
theory of moral freedom that fails to take this fact into account is far too impoverished to accept.  
 Throughout this chapter, I have focused on my interpretative disagreements with Russell. If 
Russell is right about his interpretation of Hume’s account of causal necessity and the passions, then 
he is right to judge that Hume fails to give a proper justification of the moral sentiments. In the next 
chapter, I construct a modified interpretation of Humean freedom and moral responsibility that, I 
hope, can answer Russell’s criticism.   
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4. SOCIALIZING THE PROBLEM: HUMEAN MORAL FREEDOM 
 
4.1 Socializing or Naturalizing? 
 There is good reason to reject Russell’s reading of Hume as a “feeling naturalist.” And 
insofar as Russell takes the project of scientific naturalism consist solely in the attempt to provide a 
descriptive, mechanical account of our sentiments, the term is not sufficiently broad to cover the 
phenomena that Hume is interested in with his “science of human nature.” In light of this 
observation, I argue that Hume does not seek to naturalize the problems of freedom and moral 
responsibility, but socialize them. That said: Hume is undoubtedly a naturalist, as he takes the realm of 
the social, or “artificial,” to be a modification of the natural (T, 3.1.2).  
 In Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, P.F. Strawson distinguishes between two types of 
naturalism: reductive naturalism and non-reductive naturalism.79 Reductive naturalism, best exemplified 
for Strawson in the work of W.V.O Quine, approaches human agents and their behaviors “simply as 
objects and events in nature, natural objects and natural events, to be described, analyzed and 
causally explained.”80 The reductive naturalist claims that concepts like “freedom” and “moral 
responsibility” can be fully cashed out by the cognitive and behavioral sciences. The strategy of 
reductive naturalism is clearly exemplified in one of its predecessors: Thomas Hobbes. Consider 
Hobbes’ account of liberty. He defines “the will” as that desire which, by way of a mechanistic 
process, gives rise to behavior. So long as this process achieves completion, and is not obstructed by 
external forces (natural or otherwise), then the particular behavior that results is taken to be 
voluntary. Hobbes treats moral responsibility in a like manner, reducing it to a consideration of 
whether or not one’s action was voluntary. Many philosophers that are sympathetic to a Hobbesian 
or Quinean approach to these questions are skeptical about the nature of moral responsibility. If all 
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natural objects can be described in purely causal terms, and we fail to hold mountains, rocks, trees, 
or dogs responsible; then we have reason to believe that our practices of holding other natural 
objects responsible (adult human beings) are misguided.  
 In contrast to reductive naturalism, Strawson defends a form of non-reductive naturalism. 
The central claim of this view is that we are “naturally social beings; given with…a natural 
commitment to that web or structure of human personal and moral attitudes, feelings, and 
judgments.”81 For the non-reductive naturalist, our concepts of freedom and moral responsibility 
cannot be fully articulated by the cognitive and behavioral sciences because our human agency is 
constituted by our social and moral relations, which are irreducibly complex. According to Strawson, 
the chief error of the reductive naturalist lies in his attempt to give an account of human action 
abstracted from our conditions of sociality. Though reductive naturalism succeeds in giving a 
“detached” or “objective” account of the human agent, it fails to recognize that this is not a 
perspective that can be inhabited indefinitely: “Our natural disposition to such attitudes and 
judgments is naturally secured against arguments suggesting that they are in principle unwarranted or 
unjustified just as our natural disposition to belief in the existence of body is naturally secured 
against arguments suggesting that it is in principle uncertain.”82 And because the non-reductive 
naturalist is able to capture a wider variety of relevant phenomena in her account of human agency 
than the reductive naturalist is able to, Strawson thinks that we can say that the non-reductive 
naturalist is, in fact, the more complete form of naturalism.  
 Russell makes much of the comparison between Hume and Strawson, arguing that both 
figures claim that “we cannot understand the nature and conditions of moral responsibility without 
reference to the crucial role that moral sentiment plays in this sphere” (feeling naturalism) and that 
“[we should] try to understand the conditions of freedom in terms of an empirically better informed 
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theory of responsibility” (scientific naturalism).83 Because Russell takes Hume and Strawson to be in 
agreement on fundamental issues, we can assume that Russell considers Hume, like Strawson, to be 
a non-reductive naturalist. However, the contents of Russell’s naturalistic interpretation put Hume 
closer to reductive naturalism on three major points: first, Russell claims that Hume holds a regularity 
theory of causation (section 2.1); second, Russell interprets Hume’s account of the passions as 
purely descriptive and mechanical (section 2.2); and third, Russell argues that, for Hume, attributions of 
moral responsibility are not dependent on considerations of moral freedom (section 2.3). The picture 
of Hume we receive from Russell’s naturalistic interpretation is that of a modern-day Hobbesian. 
 I do not think this form of hard-headed reductive naturalism captures the spirit of Hume’s 
philosophy. That said: I do think that Russell is right to draw attention to the philosophical parallels 
between Hume and Strawson. In my estimation, Hume accepts a form of what Strawson calls a non-
reductive naturalism. For the sake of clarity, though not elegance, I have chosen the alternate term 
socialized to mark this interpretation, lest it be confused with Russell’s naturalized interpretation. 
Hume is primarily concerned with us as moral beings, and not as mere objects of nature. Hume 
closes the Treatise of Human Nature with a discussion of the anatomist and the painter. He notes that 
the anatomist can give advice to the painter by providing him with “an exact knowledge of the 
parts,” but that there is something “hideous, or at least minute in the views of thing, he [the 
anatomist] presents” (T, 3.3.3.6). Hume judges that the anatomist, a Hobbesian of sorts, is necessary 
to the science of human nature, but that he must ultimately answer to the painter: “the most abstract 
speculations concerning human nature, however cold and unentertaining, become subservient to 
practical morality; and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts” (T, 3.3.3.6). For 
Hume, we are of nature, but we are not mere nature: we possess capacities that are not shared by all 
others that are equally of nature (trees, volcanoes, fish, rocks, etc.). On account of our shared 
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capacities, we form a moral community. It is from one’s having these capacities that common 
sympathies are developed and conventions are forged; and it is within this context that questions of 
freedom and moral responsibility arise.  
 Russell considers a species of the proposed “socialized” interpretation of Humean moral 
freedom, but dismisses it on three grounds:84 
 (1) Hume’s claim that “objects of moral sentiment should be understood, simply, as 
 creatures who  possess pleasurable or painful mental qualities—is plainly inadequate and 
 unacceptable” to any account of moral freedom.85 
 (2) Although Hume was aware of the importance of language to moral capacity and moral 
 community, what he “has to say in this regard is rather thin and sketchy.”86 
 (3) Hume downplays “that we have a capacity to reflect critically on our moral character and 
 can in some measure alter or amend our character on this basis,” an essential component of 
 an account of moral freedom.87 
In the sections that follow, I respond to each of Russell’s concerns. By arguing that Hume holds a 
normative theory of causation (section 3.2) and that the moral sentiments, which are socially reflexive 
in nature, require causal inferences to function properly (section 3.3), I show that Hume does not 
take just any “creatures who possess pleasurable or painful mental qualities” to be the object of the 
moral judgments. In the last part of the paper (section 3.4), I respond to Russell’s second concern by 
arguing that Hume takes the importance of a common moral language to be central to our ability to 
make moral judgments, and thus to hold one another responsible. For Hume, it is the ability to use 
this common language that ties us to our fellows, making us members of a moral community. At the 
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same time, I show that, in virtue of being part of a moral community, we are able to engage in 
relevant sorts of character reflection and correction. 
 
4.2 The Normativity of Causal Reasoning 
 If Russell is right about Hume having a regularity theory of causation, then Hume is 
committed to an account of causation that provides no criterion for demarcating correct causal 
inferences from incorrect ones. And because the functioning of the moral sentiments depends on 
one’s ability to make causal inferences, the regularity theory of causation leaves Hume without the 
conceptual resources to label certain instances of responsibility attribution as improper. If Hume is to 
have a worthwhile sentimentalist theory of moral responsibility, he needs to be able to account for, 
as Russell points out, the “cognitive-evaluative” content of the passions. Over the next two sections, 
I argue that Hume can meet Russell’s challenge. In this section, I argue that Hume considers causal 
inferences to be normative. In the following section, I show how construing causal inferences 
normatively supplies the moral sentiments with the proper cognitive-evaluative content.  
 What does it mean to have a normative account of causation? A regularity theory of causation 
holds that the judgment “x causes y” ought to be cashed out as “ceteris paribus, x is regularly 
succeeded by y.” To use A.J. Ayer’s term: on a regularity theory, for x to cause y means that they are 
“factually correlated” with one another.88 In contrast, a normative theory of causation holds that the 
judgment “x causes y” is more correctly understood as “there exists a law of nature governing the 
relation between x and y, such that if x, then [necessarily] y.” In other words, for x to cause y means 
that there is, as Hume puts, a “power or necessary connexion” that necessitates that if x happens, then 
y does as well (EHU, 58).  
 Hume offers two definitions of “cause”: treating it as, what he labels, both a philosophical 
relation (relation of concepts) and a natural relation (relation of psychological states). As a 
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philosophical relation, he defines causation as “an object precedent and contiguous to another, and 
where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity 
to those objects that resemble the latter” (T, 1.3.14.31). This definition makes it look like Hume is 
giving a regularity theory, for the governing relation between an effect and its cause is resemblance, and 
not necessity. As a natural relation, he defines causation as “an object precedent and contiguous to 
another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determined the mind to form the idea of the 
other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other” (T, 1.3.14.31). 
According to this definition, the governing relation between a cause and effect is psychological 
necessity, and not resemblance. Resemblance and necessity are very different relations for Hume: 
resemblance “admits of many different degrees” (1.3.13.25), while necessity fails to admit of chance or 
probability (1.3.11). If the natural relation of causation is governed by necessity and the 
philosophical relation by resemblance, then the two definitions do seem to be at odds with one 
another: for how can a cause be merely regular, yet necessary?  
 One should not treat the “philosophical” and “natural” relations of cause as two separate 
definitions, but as singular components of Hume’s larger account of causation. After distinguishing the 
two types of causal relation, Hume states that “all causes are of the same kind” (T, 1.3.14.32), and 
gives a more general account of the causal relation: “an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so 
united with it in imagination, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the 
impression of the one to form a more livelily idea of the other” (T, 1.3.15.35). Notice that this definition 
combines the accounts of natural and philosophical causation. One experiences x and y as constantly 
conjoined, which, by means of the association of resemblance, causes the mind to consider x and y 
as standing in a relation of constant conjunction with one another (philosophical relation). On the 
basis of this constant conjunction, the mind, upon experiencing x, is determined to form the idea of y 
(natural relation). The reason why Hume chooses to distinguish between the philosophical and 
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natural relations is to explain why our minds are susceptible to causal reasoning. He thinks that there 
must be something about our minds such that we experience things causally at all. The concept of 
“constant conjunction” is not sufficient to explain this fact about us. One could, in principle, notice 
a relation of constant conjunction without concluding that the two objects in question are causally 
related. Hume concludes that it is because the relation of constant conjunction has a particular 
psychological effect on us that we tend to make causal inferences. In other words, it is only because our 
minds are constituted in the way they are that “after a frequent repetition, I find, that, upon the 
appearance of one of the object, the mind is determin’d by custom to consider its usual attendant, and 
to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object” (T, 1.3.14.1). 
 After further reflection on our psychological capacities, Hume notes that we come to two 
conclusions: that our mind is determined “the same with those of matter (material objects)” (T, 
1.3.14.12) and that the nature of the causal relation “depends so much on the [casual] inference” (T, 
1.3.14.29). Our minds are determined—in the manner that a ball is determined to fall to the ground 
when thrown—to infer from cause to effect upon experiencing the constant conjunction of two 
objects. At the same time, it is only through the performance of the causal inference that the causal 
relation, and so the determination of our minds, is established. This line of thought seems circular. If 
causal relations are dependent on causal inferences, and we are the authors of causal inferences, how 
can we know if our mind is subject to the same determination as matter? Further: how can we know 
if matter is actually determined if it is we, the determiners, that dictate its determinateness? But if we 
look closer, Hume’s reasoning is not circular; it is reflexive. His claim is that our minds are causally 
structured, and that we come to understand that this is the case through an investigation into the 
nature of casual inference.  For Hume, we can only investigate the structures of the mind only 
indirectly, inferring its structure from experiencing what it does. The overlap between Hume and the 
German Idealists on this point is notable. As Annette Baier points out, with his stress on the 
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reflexive nature of the natural and philosophical relation of cause, Hume strikes “a balance between 
the empiricist emphasis on the determination of our minds by nature’s constancies, and the idealist 
emphasis on what only mind can contribute, the modal element, the ‘must,’ the ‘tis necessary.’”89  
 So what is normative about Hume’s account of causal relation? Hume claims that our minds 
are naturally constituted so as to expect the future to follow the past. He refers to our tendency to 
“transfer the past to the future” as a “full and perfect” habit (T, 1.3.12.10). This perfect habit of ours 
accounts for the impression of mental determination that we feel when we engage in causal 
reasoning. The habit functions as a rule for cognition, informing it of justified causal inferences. 
Every time I decide to raise my arm, my arm goes up. If I were to ask myself, “If I decide to raise 
my arm, does my arm go up?” I would immediately answer “Yes, certainly; it always has.” It is only 
when we come across “contrary experiments,” or phenomena of which we have no experience, that 
our perfect habit to transfer the past to the future is “weakened” (T, 1.3.22.12). In these cases, we do 
not feel an impression of mental determination. So, if it were the case that one day, my arm did not 
go up when I decided to raise it, I would not feel as confident in my causal claim that “if I decide to 
raise my arm, then it will go up.” In cases of reduced confidence, we feel that our causal claim is 
merely probable since our cognition fails to provide us with a rule for governing relations of 
probability. Why not? Well, for Hume, probability is not a suitable philosophical relation:   
 The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty of 
 events to such an uncertainty in the causes…But philosophers observing, that almost in 
 every part of nature there is contain’d a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid, 
 by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that ‘tis at least possible the contrariety of 
 events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of 
 contrary causes (T, 1.3.12.5). 
So, if my arm failed to go up when I decide to raise it, it must either be the case that (1) some, yet 
unknown, force impeded my ability to raise my arm in this instance or (2) I was simply wrong about 
                                                          
89 Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 90 
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what causes my arm to go up in the first place; perhaps my bodily movement is not tied to any 
“decision” I make after all. Until I can settle whether (1) or (2) is the correct explanation, I will feel 
that the connection between “my decision” and “my arm going up” has yet to be established. 
 In this case, my habit of expecting my arm to go up when I make the decision to raise it is 
confronted with what Annette Baier calls my meta-habit to expect the future to follow the past.90 My 
meta-habit—which seeks to “form more specific epistemic habits”—confronts my particular habit 
to expect there to be a necessary connection between my “decision” and my “bodily movement,” 
and dictates the following to it: because in this instance, the future did not follow the past, you can 
no longer suppose that the connection between the decision to raise your arm and your arm going 
up is a necessary one.91 My meta-habit acts as a check on my more specific epistemic habit, holding 
them to the standard that “what was, shall continue to be.” Not only do we provide causal structure 
to our minds by the process of causal inference, but we provide the rules by which proper causal 
inferences can be made by holding our epistemic habits to standards of contiguity.  
 By reflecting on our ability to engage in self-correction, we can see that our causal inferences are 
rule-governed. Those inferences that do not track necessary connections between objects are 
demoted to claims of probability, and thus do not have the same “hold” on the mind as those 
inferences that are treated as authentically causal. Through reflection, we come to understand that 
our ability to engage in causal inference is then not a mere reaction to our environment, but a 
rational engagement with it.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
90 Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 85 
91 Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 85 
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4.3 The Sentiments and their Reasons 
 Russell argues both that Hume is a “feeling naturalist” and that he holds a “feeling theory” 
of the passions. In the previous chapter, I gave some preliminary reasons to reject Russell’s 
interpretation. Hume does claim that attributions of moral responsibility are made by our sentiments, 
but he does not hold a feeling theory of the passions, as he does not consider our passions to be mere 
sensations. Therefore, I reject Russell’s label of feeling naturalism. The moral sentiments require causal 
inferences—concerning the relation between action and motive, motive and character, etc.—to 
function properly. Since these causal inferences are normative, our sentiments are not devoid of 
reason, but guided by it. Further, I argue that Hume’s account of the passions is not mechanistic 
because of the central role that sympathy plays in how the indirect passions function. I begin by 
considering the relation between sympathy and the indirect passions.  
 Let us consider the passion of “pride.” Hume considers pride to be a violent, indirect 
passion. Pride is a violent passion because it is a vivacious, and it is indirect because it does not arise 
immediately from sensations of pleasure and pain. He distinguishes between original and secondary 
causes of pride. The original cause of pride is the “double relation of impressions and ideas”: some 
agent observes a beautiful house (impression) that belongs to her (idea), and she feels a sensation of 
pleasure on account of the relation she has to the beautiful house qua beautiful object (impression) 
and the beautiful house qua beautiful object that belongs to her (idea). But the double relation of 
impressions and ideas is not enough to sustain her passion; for this, she needs other people to 
validate her pride. As Hume notes, “our reputation, our character, our name are consideration of 
vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches, have little 
influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others” (T, 2.1.11.1). It is through 
the secondary cause of the sympathy of others that our passions of pride—or any other indirect 
passion—receive continued existence. If one planted a tremendous garden, one would feel a great 
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sense of pride upon its completion; nevertheless, if the garden was never viewed by anyone except 
oneself, one’s pride would likely diminish over time on account of neglect. This is, of course, why 
we speak of the need to share experiences, situations, projects, etc., with others.  
 Sympathy does not overcome the original cause of the passion it is affixed with, but acts 
reflexively with it. At one time, you may have felt proud of the tremendous garden you planted. It has 
been five years since you planted it; and since then, you have learned much about the art of planting 
gardens. Because of this, you do not feel the same amount of pride for the garden as you once it did. 
Still, other people seem insistent on praising you for the beauty of the garden. Their praise fails to 
reignite the original passion in you because, as Hume notes, “the praises of other never give us much 
pleasure, unless they concur with our own opinion, and extol us for those qualities, in which we 
chiefly excel” (2.1.11.13). That is to say: if the original cause of the passion is not present, the secondary 
causes will fail to have an effect on you. The only way the sympathy of others could reignite our 
sense of pride is if it somehow strengthened the relation between us and the object qua beautiful 
object (2.1.11.5). Not only is it required that the sympathy of other people match up with our 
original passion, but we must ourselves be in sympathy with those who seek to praise us. It is not 
enough for anyone to praise us, for “we are not only better pleased with the approbation of a wise 
man than with that of a fool, but receive additional satisfaction from the former, when ‘tis obtain’d 
after a long and intimate acquaintance” (T, 2.1.11.12).92 Still, the sympathy of our fellows is necessary 
for the continued existence of our indirect passions; meaning that, in a not so insignificant sense, the 
functioning of the majority of our passions are dependent on our relations with others: “the 
principle of sympathy is of so powerful and insinuating a nature, that enters into most of our 
sentiments and passions” (T, 3.3.2.3).  
                                                          
92 Though our opinion of those that are in sympathy with our passions effects the pleasure we receive from it, 
Hume notes that “popular fame may be agreeable even to a man who despises the vulgar; but ‘tis because 
their multitude gives them additional weight and authority” (T, 2.1.11.19).  
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 Pride is not, strictly speaking, a moral sentiment (these are the calm, indirect passions). But 
we can see, by way of Hume’s treatment of the necessary role sympathy plays in the functioning of 
the indirect passions, that Russell’s “feeling theory” interpretation is wrongheaded. Russell claims 
that Hume’s account of the passions concerns the “mechanics which generate peculiar, atomistic 
sensations.”93 Russell’s appeal to the “effect” that the passions have on “certain modes of behavior” 
is unhelpful, it provides an impoverished, atomistic account of the indirect passions.94 Indirect 
passions, having two causes, are going to be defined not only by “the internal operations of the 
mind” (T, 2.1.11.7), but by the relation that the particular passions stand in to the passions of our 
fellows in sympathy with us. The particular passion is not only going to be defined by the kind of 
sympathy that it causes in our fellows, and in what circumstances it is apt to do so, but also by the 
effect that the sympathy of others will have on the original cause of a particular passion.95 The 
indirect passions can be said to be outer-directed, for it is social context as much as it is their 
“mechanical” story that gives them content. 
 One may object by pointing out that the social is mechanical for Hume. For, he notes at the 
close of the Dissertation on the Passions that, “it is sufficient for my purpose, if I have made it appear, 
that, in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is 
susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of 
natural philosophy” (DOP, 6.19.19). I do not deny that much of Hume’s general philosophical 
project is to give a mechanistic account of the various functions of our mind, but it is important to be 
careful about how we parse the language in this passage. The laws of natural philosophy are all causal 
laws. And though Hume stresses the primacy of causal relations in his account of association, he 
                                                          
93 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 89. 
94 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 90. 
95 In many ways, Hume’s attention is primarily drawn towards questions about “the effect particular passions 
have on the sympathy of our fellows” and “the effect the sympathy of our feels has on the original cause of 
particular passions.” For a good discussion of this, see his discussion of malice and envy (T, 2.2.8)—and, 
more specifically, the effect that judgments of merit and demerit have on each of the passions.  
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also claims that resemblance is central to the functioning of sympathy, and thus the passions: “‘tis 
obvious, that nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human creatures, and that we never 
remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or other, we may not find a 
parallel in ourselves” (2.1.11.5). It is also on account of sympathy and resemblance that we 
experience the wide array of “mixed” passions that Hume considers.96 Sure, we could give the mixed 
passions a more mechanistic explanation—Hume ends up appealing to “the whole bent or 
tendency” of a pain or pleasure to account for their existence (T, 2.2.9.2)—but this would be to miss 
the point. Even if we could account for all of our passions in terms of various mechanisms in the 
mind, it is still the case that our passions are not merely mechanistic. To make the latter argument, as 
Russell does, is to judge that our mental states are physical states on account of their instantiation in 
the brain: a claim, to quote Sellars, that is “either very exciting but false, or true but relatively 
uninteresting.”97 
 Now that we have discussed the social nature of the passions, let us consider the integral role 
that reason plays in the functioning of the moral sentiments. Hume is claimed to have held a 
“combat” theory of the relation between reason and the passions.98 Philosophers that have 
traditionally held this view consider virtue to consist in the victory of reason over the passions. 
Hume, insofar as we attribute this “combat” view to him, is taken to have turned this more 
traditional account of virtue on its head: defining virtue instead as any “mental action or quality that gives 
to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation” (EPM, 239). Further considerations of Hume’s texts 
support this reading, as his definitions of “reason” and “the passions” seem to be conflicting:  
                                                          
96 See Hume’s discussion “Of the mixture of benevolence and anger with compassion and malice” in Treatise, 
2.2.9. 
97 Wilfrid Sellars, “The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem,” In the Space of Reasons (Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1997).  
98 See Christine Korsgaard, “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” The Constitution of Agency: Essays on 
Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 27-68. 
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 The former [reason] conveys knowledge of truth and falsehood: the latter [the passions] 
 gives the sentiment of  beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as 
 they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: the other has a productive
 faculty, and gilding or  staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal 
 sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation. Reason being cold and disengaged, is no 
 motive to action and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by 
 showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives pleasure or 
 pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the 
 first spring or impulse to desire and volition. (EPM, 246) 
But while Hume considers the function of our reason and our passions to be contrary, he does not 
take them to be opposed to one another. In fact, Hume does not consider it possible that such a 
conflict between our reason and our passions should ever arise. The role of reason is to “direct our 
knowledge concerning causes and effects,” or give us an understanding of different possible courses 
of action we can take (T. 2.3.3.2). Meanwhile, “’tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the 
aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the 
causes an effect of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience” (T. 2.3.3.3). 
Our reason is seen as guide for our passions: feeding us understanding of our surroundings, and 
telling us what courses of action enable us to best fulfill our desires. That said, it is still our passions 
that serve as the spring of all our actions, and so it is only through our passions that we have the 
ability to act at all.99 
 When a passion suggests an unwise course of action, Hume points out that the role of 
reason is to suggest that said course of action undermines the ability of the passion to fulfill itself. 
He thinks that our passions can be subject to our reason in two ways: “first, when a passion, such as 
hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition of the existence of 
                                                          
99 As Hume notes in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, “here therefore reason instructs us in the 
several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and 
beneficial (EPM, 235). 
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objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, when in exerting in passion in action, we choose means 
insufficient for the design’d end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects” 
(T.2.3.3.6). Say I feel resentment towards my friend for stealing my first edition of Black Flag’s 
“Nervous Breakdown” EP. For obvious reasons, I wish to have this record back. The resentment I 
have for my friend creates the desire to assault him, which I judge will be the best way to get my 
record back. How could my resentment, and subsequent action, be “incorrect,” on Humean 
grounds? Well, it could be the case that I have simply misplaced the record; in which case, the 
resentment I feel towards my friend would be misdirected, and so the action that flowed from it 
would be equally incorrect. In this case, my resentment was directed at an object I supposed to 
exist—my friend qua record thief—that, upon further investigation, did not. According to this 
condition, if I had gotten the facts right, my resentment would have been properly directed. But even 
if I did get the facts right, Hume thinks my passion may still be improper. Perhaps the best way to 
get my record back is not to assault my friend, but to give him back a record of his that I had stolen. 
In this case, because my end was to get the record back, and because my resentment motivated me 
to undertake an action that would ensure that my goal was not realized, my resentment was improper. 
 But there are still problems about the relation between the passions and reason: reason may 
somehow “have a say” in how the passions go about realizing their ends, but this does not mean 
that the passions themselves are intelligent in any way. However, this is not entirely true. Hume 
notes that “the moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any 
means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition” (T, 2.3.3.7). So, if there was a 
passion—such as malice—that dictated a mode of conduct to us that was either unreasonable or 
misdirected, Hume thinks, quite optimistically, that this passion would cease to influence our 
conduct. Also, remember that the passions are not mere sensations. Reason discerns the effect of 
certain modes of conduct, and the effects are themselves “presented,” so to speak, to our sentiment. 
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But it is because of our elementary ability to experience pleasure and pain (which makes us 
susceptible to the influence of forces external to us) and our ability to sympathize with our fellow 
beings (with whom we are naturally in tune) that we judge the conduct to be either proper or 
improper. As Annette Baier notes: 
 Reason directs, while passion sets the aims. Reason can work out the effects of actions, but 
 the decision as to whether such effects are welcome is made by our capacity to feel pleasure 
 or distress, when this is influenced by our capacity to share other’s pleasure and 
 distress…our sense of what is admirable and contemptible and our capacity for sympathy are 
 enough to explain our moral judgments.100  
 
Our already reflexive passions give us plenty of information about the needs and desires of ourselves 
and others prior to the influence of reason on them. The fact that our minds are “mirrors to one 
another” leads to me to naturally consider your well-being (T, 2.2.6.21). Reason will frustrate our 
conduct only when the mirror has built up a layer of dust from neglect; or worse, when the mirror 
has cracked.  
 
4.4  Freedom and Moral Community 
 
 My claim in this section is simple: Hume takes freedom to consist in an agent’s being the 
proper object of the moral sentiments, which requires that she possess certain capacities. In light of 
these capacities, she is properly taken to be a member of the moral community. The existence of the 
moral community is predicated on a common moral language and shared conventions; the agent’s 
membership in the community depends on her ability to take part in them. In what follows, I 
respond to Russell’s last two objections to the socialized interpretation of Humean moral freedom—
that Hume’s conception of moral capacity and language “is rather thin and sketchy,” and that he 
neglects our “capacity to reflect critically on our moral character”—by arguing that Hume’s account 
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of moral language underwrites the ability to make proper responsibility attributions, which itself 
supplies a social basis for character correction.101  
 Attributions of moral responsibility are constituted by the moral sentiments of approbation 
and disapprobation (which, are themselves taken to be a species of the calm, indirect passions). For 
one to be considered morally responsible is for one to be taken as an object of the moral sentiments. 
As Hume notes, “an action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? Because its view 
causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind” (T, 3.1.2.3). But it is not mere pleasure or 
uneasiness that invites censure or blame from our fellows, for “’tis easy to observe that it 
[distinctions of virtue and vice] has also a considerable dependence on the principle of sympathy so 
depended on” (T, 3.3.1.29). Sympathy is required for the functioning of the moral sentiments 
because all indirect passions require sympathy for their continued existence (T, 2.1.11). Even our 
more violent, indirect passions—like vanity or hatred—will dissipate if they are not reinforced by 
like minds. Not only are the moral sentiments inherently social (as opposed to merely sensational), but 
all instances of moral judgment demand that one reference a “common moral language.” As Hume 
writes: 
 ‘tis impossible men cou’d ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose 
 some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might 
 cause it to appear the same to all of them. Now in judging of character, the only interest or 
 pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose 
 character is examin’d; or that of persons, who have connexion to him. And tho’ such 
 interests and pleasure touch us more faintly than our own, yet being more constant and 
 universal, they counter-balance the latter even in practice, and are alone admitted in 
 speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They alone produce that particular feeling 
 or sentiment, on which moral distinctions depend. (T, 3.3.1.30) 
 
This moral language is not explicitly established, but it emerges through our natural  
                                                          
101 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 93 
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interactions with one another. For Hume, we “back into” a moral language. All humans share the  
same biological makeup and have “at least the seeds and first principles” of the moral sentiments  
(EPM, 180). This natural condition, combined with humankind’s predisposition to form groups, 
leads to the development of communication; first as non-verbal expression and then as a  
formal language. Initially, an agent uses language to secure his interests. But over time, he learns to  
use words of “intersubjective significance”: “bad,” “foul,” etc.102 Through the use of these words, the  
agent learns to speak from a position that is not, strictly speaking, first-person singular. And for  
Hume, as soon as we learn to set ourselves beyond ourselves, “we bring our own deportment and  
conduct frequently in review, and consider how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and  
regard us” (EPM, 225). But this moment does not mark the beginning of an impartial, abstract rule  
by which we “correct” the partial sentiments of our fellows. We do not occupy a third-person  
perspective, external to the moral community, when we use moral language. Instead, this ability to  
step outside ourselves is conjoined with our natural propensity to feel in sympathy with our  
fellows.23 We do not distance ourselves when taking the “general point of view,” but we learn to  
immerse ourselves in the lives of others. The result is not a “view from nowhere,” but a view from the  
“party of human kind” (EPM, 275).  
 How do the above considerations get us a theory of moral freedom? An agent’s ability to 
make moral judgments requires that she share a common moral language with her fellows, such that 
she can partake in the “common point of view” with them. If she does not share a common moral 
language with others, she is not taken to have the relevant capacities for being considered within the 
realm of the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. This fact is seen in how Hume 
treats the relation between humans and non-human animals. The latter can only experience violent, 
direct passions: “they can judge of objects only by their sensible good or evil, which they produce, 
                                                          
102 I adopt this notion of “intersubjective significance” from David Wiggins. See David Wiggins, Ethics: Twelve 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 45. 
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and from that must regulate their affections towards them” (T, 2.2.12.3). Because of this, non-
human animals are unable to form moral sentiments (calm, indirect passions), and thus cannot make 
genuine responsibility attributions. Their inability to make said judgments is reflected in how we treat 
them. One can feel a sense of delight towards one’s pet, but Hume claims that our liking of them “is 
not caus’d so much by relation, as in our species,” but by a more simplistic pleasure we feel in their 
company (T, 2.2.12.4). In other words: we are unable to feel moral approbation for their conduct. 
Hume does not consider non-human animals to be a priori excluded from our moral community—
though he admits that we would be unlikely to sympathize with them, for much of the sympathy we 
feel for our fellows is based on “a peculiar similarity in our manner, or character, or country, or 
language” (T, 2.1.11.5). If it were the case that non-human animals could form calm, indirect 
passions, and if we came to see them as more like ourselves, Hume would have no principled reason 
for stopping them from entering the moral community.  
 As noted previously, not all members of the moral community are taken to be equally 
responsible. Hume points to three “excusing conditions.” The first condition states that an agent 
that performs an evil act “ignorantly or causally” is not subject to blame (T, 2.3.2.7). So, if you 
accidently take someone’s suitcase at the airport because it looks like yours, or you are physically 
compelled to do so at gunpoint, Hume claims that it would be incorrect to hold you morally 
blameworthy. The second excusing condition states that an agent that performs an evil act “hastily 
and unpremeditatedly” (T, 2.3.2.7) is to have diminished responsibility. In our legal system, we 
distinguish between first-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter for particularly this reason. 
Hume wants to make the claim, and rightfully so, that there is difference between premeditatedly 
murdering your wife’s lover and doing so in the “heat of the moment.” The last excusing condition 
states that if an agent repents for her wrongdoing, she is absolved of blame (T, 2.3.2.7). So, if you 
sincerely seek atonement for your past life of crime, Hume argues that it would not be right for us to 
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persist in our considerations of you as a vicious character. In all cases, the agent is excused of some, 
or all, responsibility because her conduct somehow mismatched the nature of her character: whether 
it be because the “actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone,” or because the action 
did not proceed from a “constant cause in the mind” or because the agent’s reformation disproves 
the “just proof” of the necessary connection between the criminal act and her criminal nature (T, 
2.3.3.7). Before the agent could be considered a proper candidate for the excusing conditions, it is 
necessary that she be taken as a member of the moral community. 
 One must be careful to not conflate the following two positions: “an agent is free insofar as 
she is a member of the moral community” and “an agent is free insofar as she has the relevant 
capacities to be considered the proper object of the moral sentiments.” I am arguing that Hume’s 
view is best represented by the latter position, and not the former. Consider the consequences of the 
former position. If an agent is taken to be free on account of his membership in the moral 
community, and he is in fact a member of said community, then it is impossible for him to be 
considered unfree. Hume’s claim that we employ “excusing conditions” in the treatment of our fellow 
members is rendered conceptually impossible by such a view. The latter position is much more 
reasonable. Our membership in a moral community is a natural product of our having certain 
capacities or abilities. It is these capacities, and not the membership per se, that renders us free. We 
come to a better understanding of the nature of the relevant capacities through reflection on the 
functioning of the moral sentiments, and our regular practices of holding one another responsible.   
 How does the socialized interpretation of moral freedom answer Russell’s concerns about 
the ability to critically reflect on one’s character? In short, Hume is not able to answer Russell’s 
specific concern. When Russell levels this criticism against Hume, he has in mind the ability of an 
agent to “identify herself with her actions and feelings insofar as they are what she wants them to 
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be.”103 Hume never mentions the capacity to identify oneself with one’s conduct. However, one 
should not confuse his silence on this matter with a lack of concern for the nature of moral 
character. When it comes to questions of morality, Hume is not particularly interested in the first-
person perspective; thus his account of “critical reflection” on one’s character, norms, society, etc. 
does not take the shape of an individual deliberating about these matters. Consider the following 
reflection from Hume: “pride, or an over-weaning conceit of ourselves, must be vicious; since it 
causes uneasiness in all men, and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison” (T, 
3.3.2.7). By recognizing the effect that our undue sense of pride has on the sentiments of others, we 
are able to see that our passion is vicious, being contrary to the conduct of a person “of sense and 
merit” (T, 3.3.2.10). We need not even be subject to direct censure from our fellows to reconsider our 
conduct and character, for we can sympathize with the disapprobation of those we have never 
met.104 I may be of a disagreeable nature, and yet sympathize with the Athenian populace’s 
annoyance with Socrates on account of his disagreeable nature. This sense of sympathy I feel with 
the Athenian populace could be used to temper my own disagreeable nature. From these examples, 
we can see that Hume is clearly interested in correction of one’s character; he simply considers the 
solution to the problem to be social, and not deliberative.  
 Now that I have explained the socialized interpretation of Humean moral freedom, how does 
it relate to its classical compatibilist and naturalistic alternatives? The classical compatibilist interpretation 
correctly points out that Hume takes freedom and moral responsibility to be inextricably linked: an 
agent can be properly held responsible only if his action or character fulfills certain prior conditions 
(where these conditions are cashed out in terms of capacities, abilities, or conditions of 
                                                          
103 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 92. For more on this notion of identification, see Harry Frankfurt’s 
essay “Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person,” in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical 
Essays (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
104 Hume refers to this phenomenon as the double rebound of sympathy: “we sympathize with those people in 
their uneasiness; and as their uneasiness proceeds in part from a sympathy with the person who insults them, 
we may here observe a double rebound of sympathy” (T, 3.3.3.17). 
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noninterference). That said: the classical compatibilist fails to grasp both the sentimentalist nature of 
Hume’s account of moral responsibility, and the extent to which we gain knowledge of the capacities 
necessary to our freedom through the articulation of our practices of holding one another responsible. 
The naturalistic interpretation accurately recognizes that Hume’s account of moral responsibility is 
based in our passions; and that through an investigation into human nature, we can come to a better 
understanding of our concepts of freedom and moral responsibility. Still, the naturalistic 
interpretation falls short by failing to regard attributions of responsibility as dependent on judgments 
about capacities or abilities that an agent possesses, and by overemphasizing the physiological and 
psychological aspects of Hume’s account of moral responsibility. As I see it, the proposed socialized 
interpretation cuts a middle path between the classical compatibilist and naturalistic interpretations: 
recognizing the sentimentalist nature of Humean moral responsibility, but anchoring it in 
considerations of one’s capacity to participate in a moral community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57 
5. CONCLUSION 
 With this project, I set out to provide a modified account of the naturalistic interpretation that 
Paul Russell defends in this work Freedom and Moral Sentiment. Russell is right to criticize the overly 
rationalist classical compatibilist interpretation, and to stress the central role the moral sentiments 
play in Hume’s account of moral responsibility. However, Russell fails to consider Annette Baier’s 
observation that “Hume’s project all along has been not so much to dethrone reason as to enlarge 
our conception of it, to make it social and passionate.”105 Because Russell places so much 
importance on the passions, he tends to underemphasize, or miss, the fact that the moral sentiments 
depend on judgments about certain capacities or abilities to function properly. It is these capacities, 
which are social in origin, that constitute Hume’s account of moral freedom 
 Though it is a mere sketch of a theory, the socialized interpretation of Humean moral 
freedom I defended in this paper has merit on three fronts. First, Russell admits that a species of the 
socialized interpretation is conceivable, though implausible. I gave what I took to be an adequate 
response to each of Russell’s arguments, leading me to believe that such a view is plausible. Second, 
Russell is right to claim that Humean moral responsibility is deeply social, but his hesitancy to 
reevaluate Hume’s concept of moral freedom leads Russell to attribute an implausible theory of 
moral responsibility to Hume. The socialized interpretation of Human moral freedom preserves the 
sociality of the sentiments, while providing ample room for our reason to exert its influence on 
them. Third, it seems to me that we are lead to attribute the socialized interpretation of moral 
freedom, or something like it, to Hume on account of the texts themselves: especially considering 
his account of the passions and causal inference. 
 
 
                                                          
105 Baier, A Progress of Sentiments, 278 
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